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Abstract 
Fearing the Uncertain: A Causal Exploration of Self-Esteem, Self-Uncertainty, and 
Mortality Salience  
by 
 
Zachary P. Hohman 
 
Claremont Graduate University: 2012 
 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is one of the most influential social 
psychological theories of group behavior and intergroup relations. Early social identity 
research focused on many different group processes; however, the motivation behind 
group identification was not fully explored. Researchers have proposed a variety of 
accounts for why people join and identify with groups. This dissertation unravels the 
relationship between, on the one hand, mortality salience, self-related uncertainty and 
self-esteem, and on the other group identification and ingroup defense. The general 
hypothesis derived from uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2010) is that uncertainty and 
not fear of death or pursuit of self-esteem motivate people to identify with and defend 
their groups, and that identification mediates the relationship between uncertainty and 
defense of the group. Experiment 1 (N = 112) tested the relationship between uncertainty 
and self-esteem on defense of the ingroup, with the additional test of the mediating 
effects of identification with the group between uncertainty and ingroup defense. Results 
showed that uncertainty and not self-esteem motivate people to identify with a group, to 
defend their group, and that group defense is mediated by identification.  Experiment 2 
(N = 112) provided a replication of the typical TMT study, which suggests that self-
esteem will buffer the effects of mortality salience on ingroup defense, with the 
additional test of the mediating effects of identification between mortality salience and 
defense of one’s group. As predicted, mortality salience only increased identification and 
defense of the group when self-esteem was not enhanced, as well, the interactive effects 
of mortality salience and self-esteem on defense was mediated by identification.  
Experiment 3 (N = 294) was a combination of both Experiments 1 and 2 and tested the 
hypothesis that uncertainty would moderate the relationship between self-esteem and 
mortality salience on group identification and ingroup defense. Exactly as predicted, only 
under high uncertainty the typical TMT results are demonstrated. Results across these 
three experiments demonstrate that self-uncertainty plays a significant role in reactions to 
mortality salience, and support uncertainty-identity theory’s analysis of the role of self-
uncertainty in ideological conviction and group behavior. 
  
Dedication 
 I dedicate this work to my mother, father, and wife. Mom and dad you provided 
me with the opportunity to do anything with my life and I am forever grateful for that. 
Bre, before meeting you the thought of graduate school, more less a PhD, seemed 
laughable. However, you bring the best out of me and make me a better person. 
 Acknowledgements  
 There are many people that helped me during my time at Claremont Graduate 
University. First, Dr. Michael A. Hogg, who has devoted a great deal of time helping 
cultivate my ideas and edit my studies to be both conducted and published. Without his 
help I definitely would not be the scientist I am today. I look forward to many more years 
of research collaboration and friendship. I also want to thank Dr. William D. Crano, he 
imparted onto me knowledge of research methodology and a desire to apply our 
knowledge to solve social issues that will undoubtedly drive my research endeavors in 
the future. 
I want to acknowledge and thank the funding source that helped make this 
dissertation possible – the Dean’s Dissertation award provided me with the funding to 
collect, analyze and write this dissertation. 
I would like to thank the many friends I made while in graduate school. The days 
we spent pointing out issues with each other’s studies and mutual support greatly 
benefited and helped me to this point. I am especially grateful to Amber Gaffney, Jason 
Rivera, and David Rast, our orals study group at the bar was truly a great time. 
Finally, I would like to thank and acknowledge the support of my wife Bre. She 
has been there through it all, both the good and the bad, and has always provided me the 
constant support I needed to succeed. Without her none of this would have been possible. 
 
 
 
 
vi  
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER ONE…………………………………………………………….. 1 
Background………………………………………………………… .. 1  
 Social Identity Theory……………………………………….. 2 
 Self-Esteem Hypothesis……………………………………... 7 
 Uncertainty-Identity Theory…………………………………. 8 
 Terror Management Theory………………………………….. 12 
The Current Research………………………………………………… 18 
CHAPTER TWO……………………………………………………………... 20 
 Experiment 1………………………………………………………….. 21 
  Method………………………………………………………… 21 
   Participants and Design……………………………….. 21 
   Procedure and Measures………………………………. 21 
  Results…………………………………………………………. 24 
   Background Variables…………………………………. 25 
   Self-Esteem Manipulation Check……………………… 25 
   Filler Task – PANAS…………………………………... 26 
   National Identification…………………………………. 27 
   Essay Evaluation……………………………………….. 28 
   Mediation Analysis…………………………………….. 29 
  Discussion……………………………………………………… 29 
CHAPTER THREE……………………………………………………………... 30 
vii 
  Experiment 2………………………………………………………….. 30 
  Method………………………………………………………… 31 
   Participants and Design……………………………….. 31 
   Procedure and Measures………………………………. 32 
  Results…………………………………………………………. 34 
   Background Variables…………………………………. 35 
   Self-Esteem Manipulation Check……………………… 36 
   Filler Task – PANAS…………………………………... 36 
   National Identification…………………………………. 38 
   Essay Evaluation……………………………………….. 39 
   Mediation Analysis…………………………………….. 40 
  Discussion……………………………………………………… 41 
CHAPTER FOUR……………………………………………………………... 42 
 Experiment 3………………………………………………………….. 42 
  Method………………………………………………………… 43 
   Participants and Design……………………………….. 43 
   Procedure and Measures………………………………. 43 
  Results…………………………………………………………. 45 
   Background Variables…………………………………. 45 
   Self-Esteem Manipulation Check……………………… 46 
   Filler Task – PANAS…………………………………... 47 
   National Identification…………………………………. 49 
viii 
    Essay Evaluation……………………………………….. 52 
   Mediation Analysis…………………………………….. 54 
  Discussion……………………………………………………… 56 
CHAPTER FIVE……………..………………………………………………... 56 
 General Discussion…………………………………………………….. 56 
References……….…………………………………………………….. 62 
Appendix A: Personality Test...……………………………………….. 75 
Appendix B: Personality Assessment………………………………….. 77 
Appendix C: PANAS……….………………………………………….. 78 
Appendix D: Essay Stimuli... ………………………………………….. 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Experiment 1: National identification as a function of uncertainty 
 and self-esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05………. 27 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1: Essay evaluation change as a function of uncertainty 
 and self-esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05…….… 28 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 1: Identification with America mediating the  
relationship between uncertainty and defense of America. Notes. * p < .05,  
** p < .01, *** p < .001………………………………………………………….. 29  
 
Figure 4. Experiment 2: National identification as a function of mortality  
salience and self-esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ  
at p < .05…………………………………………………………………………. 38 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2: Essay evaluation difference as a function of mortality  
salience and self-esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter  
differ at p < .05…………………………………………………………………... 39 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2: Identification with America mediating the relationship  
between mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of America. Notes.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; MS = mortality salient; SE = self-esteem….. 40 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 3: National identification as a function of uncertainty,  
self-esteem, and mortality salience. Notes. Bars not sharing the same  
letter differ at p < .05……………………………………………………………. 48 
 
Figure 8. Experiment 3: Essay evaluation change as a function of uncertainty, 
 self-esteem, and mortality salience. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter  
differ at p < .05………………………………………………………………….. 51 
 
Figure 9. Experiment 3: Identification with America mediating the relationship  
between mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of America under high 
uncertainty. Notes. ** p < .01, *** p < .001; MS = mortality salient;  
SE = self-esteem………………………………………………………………… 54 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE  
Background 
The need to belong and be part of a group has been a critical topic of 
psychological research since the early 1900s. For example, Sigmund Freud highlighted 
the importance of contact between people in groups (Freud, 1930). A few years later, 
Abraham Maslow, in his famous hierarchy of human needs, placed the need to belong as 
a necessity after people meet their needs for water, food, and security. Maslow (1968) 
believed that only two other basic human needs had greater priority than the need to 
belong:  physiological and security needs. It is now generally agreed that humans have a 
need to belong in and be part of a group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Levine & Kerr, 
2007). However, there is no single agreed-upon explanation for the motivational force 
behind the need to join groups. 
Social psychologists have proposed a large variety of different accounts of how 
and why people join and identify with groups (see, Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 2008); for 
example, the self-esteem hypothesis (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988), uncertainty-identity 
theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2012), and terror management theory (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; 
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004) all propose a mechanism for 
why people are motivated to identify with groups. There is still much debate in the 
literature about which of these proposals best explains group motivation (Hogg, Hohman, 
Rivera, 2008; Hohman & Hogg, 2011; van den Bos, 2009). The purpose of this 
dissertation is to unravel the relationship between mortality salience, self-related 
uncertainty, and self-esteem as they relate to group identification and defense of the 
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group. 
The focus of this dissertation is on the underlying processes that motivate people 
to identify with groups. To date, perhaps the most complete account of group 
identification and group processes comes from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). Therefore, the exposition begins by detailing the history and main components of 
social identity theory, which leads into an account of social identity theory’s analysis of 
what motivates people to identify with a group. Following social identity theory, the three 
main theories (self-esteem hypothesis, uncertainty-identity theory, and terror 
management theory) compared in this dissertation are examined in detail. Finally, the 
general paradigm for the three reported experiments is discussed in detail - leading to the 
first experiment. 
Social Identity Theory 
 Over the past 50 years social identity theory (SIT) has become one of the most 
influential social psychological theories of group behavior and intergroup relations (for 
recent reviews see, Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg, 2006). SIT is a large theory that 
includes a number of sub-theories (Abrams & Hogg, 2004), such as individual processes, 
motivational accounts, and intergroup processes. The two main components of this theory 
are the “social identity theory of intergroup relations” proposed by Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) focusing mainly on intergroup relations (e.g., intergroup conflict, prejudice, 
discrimination), and the “social identity theory of the group”, usually referred to as self-
categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), which focuses 
primarily on social cognitive processes and group life in general, including intragroup 
processes (e.g., group salience, group polarization, and group identification processes).  
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SIT developed from Tajfel’s experiences as a Polish Jew during the Second 
World War and his understandable desire to explain discrimination and prejudice 
(Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). As well, SIT developed from Tajfel’s 
dissatisfaction with social psychology’s focus on individual level explanations for group 
level phenomena – that is, the focus on individual characteristics, personality traits and 
interpersonal relations as the cause of group behaviors (Hogg, 2006). He proposed that 
prejudice and discrimination were not the expression of individual characteristics, but 
rather the result of a complex interplay of cognitive, interactive and societal level 
processes, in which the course of intergroup behavior was heavily influenced by people’s 
representations of the nature of intergroup relations in society. Framed by these meta-
theoretical convictions Tajfel famously defined social identity as “the individual’s 
knowledge that he belongs to a certain social group together with some emotional and 
value significance to him of this group membership” (Tajfel, 1972, p. 292).  
A key precursor of later social identity ideas was Tajfel’s accentuation principle 
(Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), which holds that people perceptually accentuate 
differences between stimuli that fall in different categories and perceptually accentuate 
similarities among stimuli that fall within the same category. Applied to people, we view 
those who come from the same group to be similar, and as distinct from members of 
another group, or we stereotype people according to their group membership. Subsequent 
research demonstrated that not only does perceptual accentuation occur after 
categorization, but we also behaviorally discriminate - we not only see people from the 
same group as similar but we treat them that way as well (Tajfel, 1972).  
Based on studies employing the minimal group paradigm (ascribing participants 
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to minimally defined groups in an experimental setting, see, Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, 
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), Tajfel found that categorization even on a trivial basis 
causes people to discriminate in favor of their ingroup at the expense of an outgroup. 
People strive to view their ingroup positively in comparison to relevant outgroups 
(Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg, 2006; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1978). This is 
associated with a competitive orientation between ingroup and outgroup over status and 
prestige. All groups and their members strive for greater prestige and higher status than 
relevant outgroups. This competitive orientation between groups serves a positive 
intergroup distinctiveness need and can generate behavioral competition – together these 
can translate into prejudice and discrimination as the groups jockey for position to view 
themselves positively in comparison to the outgroup. Intergroup conflict is due to an 
individual and group level need to view the ingroup in a positive light, steered by 
subjective beliefs about the nature of status relations between groups (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). 
Minimal group studies demonstrated that when thinking in terms of their groups, 
people categorize themselves as group members and not as individuals, making a clear 
distinction between personal identities and social identities. However, when examining 
the motivations behind people’s behavior, the distinction between personal and social 
identities is not binary (either personal or social), but rather varies along a continuum 
ranging from behaviors based on individual characteristics and personalities to intergroup 
relations – behaving as a typical group member (Tajfel, 1978). This distinction suggests 
that one’s social identity is not salient at all times, and that it shifts along this continuum 
to determine whether behavior is guided by individual/interpersonal processes or group 
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processes. When people are categorized as group members their behaviors are guided by 
the norms of the group. 
The research program initiated by Tajfel and colleagues did a successful job at 
detailing intergroup processes and intergroup relations, which was largely lead by the 
desire to explain an individual’s behavior at a group level. Due to the desire to focus on 
the group level, the social identity theory of intergroup relations did not focus on 
intragroup processes that lead individuals to categorize themselves as group members and 
the processes that occur after categorization.  
Self-categorization theory focuses on social categorization processes and 
phenomena, i.e., the processes that occur around the categorization of the self in terms of 
the group – e.g., social influence, norms, deindividuation, deviance, etc. (Turner et al., 
1987). Because self-categorization is a wider analysis than the earlier theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) focusing on group life in general rather than only intergroup relations it has 
been termed “the social identity theory of the group” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 42). The 
original work on self-categorization focused on how people identify with groups and 
when identification will occur. Oakes (1987) posited that people will socially identify 
with a group based on an interaction between fit and accessibility of the group, an idea 
that was drawn from Bruner (1957). Groups that are more often accessible because of use 
or because they are relevant to the situation are more likely to become salient. Also, 
groups will fit better to the extent that they can dictate the correct behavior for a person in 
a given situation and explain the behavior of other people in that situation. Thus, the 
group that is accessible and fits the best will become psychologically salient for the 
person in a given situation. After a group becomes psychologically salient people no 
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longer view themselves and others in idiosyncratic or interpersonal terms, but rather in 
terms of their group identities and associated group norms. That is, they become 
depersonalized and lose their personal identity for their social identity. 
Depersonalization is the perceptual processes where people no longer see 
themselves as unique individuals, but as members of a group with a set of expectations 
described by that group’s prototype (Turner et al., 1987; also cf. social identity model of 
deindividuation by Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). A consequence of 
depersonalization is that people are assumed to fit and behave in accordance with their 
group’s prototype. Once a person is depersonalized we no longer see them as a unique 
individual; rather, they are viewed through the lens of their group’s prototype and 
evaluated in comparison to that prototype. We not only depersonalize other people but 
ourselves as well. We no longer think of ourselves in terms of individual characteristics, 
but in terms of our group’s prototype and how well we fit the prototype. The 
depersonalization process results in members of the ingroup being perceived as similar 
and members of the outgroup as different, following the metacontrast principle (Tajfel, 
1959), which seeks to maximize intergroup differences relative to ingroup differences.  
The conceptual and theoretical insights of self-categorization theory provide 
several key additions to social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 2010; Hogg, 2006; Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988) - namely: 1) referent informational influence - social influence in 
intragroup processes (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1982; 
Turner & Oakes, 1989; Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989); 2) re-exploring group 
cohesiveness and group formation (Hogg, 1993; Hogg & Turner, 1985a, 1985b; Hogg, 
Hardie, & Reynolds, 1995; Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983); 3) 
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determining how salience affects social identification (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Oakes, 
1987; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994); and 
4) sparking an interest in the motivation behind group identification (Abrams & Hogg, 
1988, 2010). The last addition is of focal importance to the current analysis. The initial 
work on social identity theory advanced by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and followed by 
Turner and colleagues (1987) did not fully develop and layout what motivates people to 
identify with groups.  
Self-esteem hypothesis 
To fill in the motivational gap, Abrams and Hogg (1988) further developed the 
self-esteem hypothesis (describe in the original work as the need for positive 
distinctiveness and a positive social identity, Tajfel & Turner, 1979) from the original 
work of the social identity theory. Abrams and Hogg (1988) identified two corollaries to 
the relationship between self-esteem and group identification. Corollary 1 states that 
intergroup discrimination enhances social identity and elevates self-esteem – the more the 
ingroup is positively differentiated from an outgroup, the more self-esteem is enhanced as 
a group member. Corollary 2 states that people have a motivational need for positive 
self-esteem, such that low self-esteem motivates intergroup discrimination and 
identification with the group in an effort to raise self-esteem. Based on Corollary 2, the 
primary motivation behind social identification is the desire for a positive social identity, 
which arises from an individual-level self-esteem need (Sedikides & Strube, 1997). Thus, 
intragroup processes could be motivated from an individual-level need for self-esteem 
(e.g., Turner, 1982). The self-esteem hypothesis provides a tidy explanation for social 
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identity motivation – we want to view our social groups and ourselves positively, 
therefore people with lowered self-esteem should be motivated to identify with groups.  
The results of empirical tests, on the other hand, have been mixed and self-esteem 
has not consistently been found as a motivator for social identification (Abrams & Hogg, 
1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).  A comprehensive study of the self-esteem hypothesis 
found support for Corollary 1 but not Corollary 2 (Houston & Andreopoulou, 2003). 
Some claim that the lack of support is due to methodological and conceptual problems in 
the definition and measurement of self-esteem (Long & Spears, 1997; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998). Others suggest that the relationship between self-esteem and group 
motivation may be moderated by the strength of group identification, the perception of 
outgroup threat, and the intensity of self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Crocker & 
Luhtanen, 1990; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). However, even if self-esteem processes 
motivate group identification, many still recognize that other motivational mechanisms 
may be at least as important as (if not more important than) self-esteem in social identity 
processes (e.g., Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Accordingly, many researchers have moved 
beyond self-esteem to explore other possible mechanisms that motivate group 
identification. 
Uncertainty-identity Theory 
To account for the inconsistent findings from the self-esteem hypothesis, Hogg 
(2000, 2007, 2012) proposed the idea that people are motivated to identify with groups 
out of an epistemic need to reduce self-uncertainties. One of the most basic motives that 
drive people is the desire to understand and be able to predict their world. For example, 
classic work by Festinger (1954) demonstrated that when people are uncertain they will 
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look to others on how to act or to determine their level of performance on a task – a 
process referred to as social comparison. Simply, people need to know and understand 
the world and their place within their world. Not knowing or being uncertain about one’s 
self or one’s place in the world is highly uncomfortable and sets in motion behaviors 
aimed at reducing that uncertainty. 
That is not to say that all self-uncertainties are aversive and viewed as a threat. 
Some uncertainties can be considered a challenge that provides people with satisfaction 
when they are overcome; for example, a scientist who delves into some unknown to come 
with information about human nature. However, when viewed in a negative light, 
uncertainty is highly anxiety provoking and can make us feel powerless to control our 
world because we are unable to predict and plan for the future. Being socially 
marginalized, unclear about who we are, or where we belong, all raise uncertainty in an 
aversive way.  
Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2012) is based upon the 
tenet that feeling uncertain about one’s perceptions, attitudes, values, or feelings is 
uncomfortable. Feelings of uncertainty, especially those related to the self, motivate 
people to identify with social groups that have certain properties that reduce, control, or 
protect from feelings of uncertainty. The process of self-categorization as a group 
member reduces self-conceptual uncertainty because it provides a consensually validated 
group prototype that describes and prescribes who one is and how one should behave. 
The mechanism of uncertainty reduction is social categorization of self and others in 
terms of relevant group defining prototypes. It is a process that renders other people 
relatively predictable and that provides a social template for what one should feel, believe 
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and do. This occurs via the process of depersonalization. Social identities satisfy a basic 
human need to reduce uncertainty about the self (Hogg, 2007). This allows us to be able 
to program our behavior, plan action and reliably predict the behavior of others (Hogg, 
2007). Therefore, social identity processes are tightly associated with very basic human 
motivational and cognitive processes – people seek, promote and protect valuable self-
describing social identities and the social groups that define such identities.  
Highly entitative groups are particularly well equipped to reduce self-uncertainty 
through self-categorization. Entitativity is that property of a group, resting on clear 
boundaries, internal homogeneity, social interaction, clear internal structure, common 
goals, and common fate, which makes a group “groupy” (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996). Under uncertainty people prefer to identify with high entitativity groups, 
identify more strongly with them, and seek to make more entitative those groups to which 
they already belong (Hogg, 2004, 2005). With an increase in perceived entitativity comes 
an increase in adherence to the prototype. In this way the prototype provides its members 
with a clear sense of who they are, what they should believe, and how they should behave 
(Hogg, 2004, 2005, 2007). The more that people feel prototypical of the group, or the 
extent to which they believe they meet the group prototype, the less uncertain they feel.  
There now exists a solid body of evidence demonstrating that uncertainty does in 
fact motivate group identification (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Hogg, 2007; Hogg, 
Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007; Hohman, Hogg, & Bligh, 2010). While 
research supports uncertainty as a motivator behind group identification, the relationship 
between uncertainty and self-esteem is less clear, and it is possible that manipulating 
uncertainty indirectly manipulates self-esteem (Hogg & Svensson, 2012). Therefore, 
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studies manipulating uncertainty may actually be manipulating and tracking the effects of 
self-esteem, not uncertainty, on group identification. 
In order to unravel the possible confounding of uncertainty and self-esteem, Hogg 
and Svensson (2012) examined in two experiments the roles that uncertainty and self-
esteem play in motivating people to identify with a group. In the first experiment they 
manipulated uncertainty and self-affirmation and then measured participants’ 
identification with a group. The experiment was set up as an eyewitness account and 
uncertainty was manipulated by either creating a very difficult eyewitness account (high 
uncertainty) or very easy one (low uncertainty). Then participants were provided with the 
chance to either self-affirm or not. The dependent measure in the study was level of 
identification with a group created for the purposes of the study. Results indicated that 
participants identified more strongly with their group under high compared to low 
uncertainty and that self-affirmation had no effect on identification. 
In the follow-up experiment, Hogg and Svensson (2012) manipulated uncertainty, 
self-prototypicality and self-affirmation, and measured state self-esteem. The methods 
were the same as in the first experiment except that self-prototypicality was manipulated 
after uncertainty and self-esteem was measured before identification. Results indicated 
that participants had lower self-esteem in the high compared to low uncertainty 
conditions; however, self-esteem was not significantly correlated with identification. 
Additionally, there was an interaction between uncertainty and prototypicality on 
identification, even when controlling for self-esteem – uncertainty increased 
identification when participants were prototypical of the group but decreased 
identification when they were not prototypical of the group.  
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Based on the results of the two experiments the researchers suggested that they 
found evidence to support the idea that uncertainty motivated group identification 
independent of self-esteem and self-affirmation. While these conclusions are warranted 
based on the results of their studies, they measured and did not manipulate self-esteem 
preventing causal conclusions to be made about the relationship between uncertainty and 
self-esteem on identification. Therefore, to fully tease apart the relationship between self-
esteem and uncertainty the first experiment in this dissertation manipulates and crosses in 
a factorial design both uncertainty and self-esteem. This provides the opportunity to 
determine the causal relationship of both self-esteem and uncertainty on identification. 
Terror Management Theory 
Another account for why people are motivated to identify with groups comes 
from Terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; 
Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & 
Schimel, 2004). TMT is one of the most widely researched theories in social psychology 
today (for a critique, see Leary, 2004), having, according to Arndt and Vess (2008; 
Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010), inspired more than 350 separate studies in at least 15 
different countries.  
TMT was inspired by the original writings of Ernest Becker (Pyszczynski et al., 
2004), a sociologist who aspired to create a “general science of man” (Becker, 1971, p. 
79). Becker attempted to explain a wide range of human behaviors based on information 
from the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities (Becker, 1973). For this reason, 
TMT has its roots in several different scientific fields, a property which has contributed 
to its success and popularity in psychology. 
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TMT argues that the unique cognitive abilities of humans gave rise to the ability 
to realize their own mortality – death is inevitable. This realization created the potential 
for “paralyzing terror.” To adapt to and overcome this terror, humans created cultural 
worldviews. Pyszczynski and colleagues define cultural worldviews as: 
“Humanly constructed shared symbolic conceptions of reality 
that give meaning, order, and permanence to existence; provide a 
set of standards for what is valuable; and promise some form of 
either literal or symbolic immortality to those who believe in the 
cultural worldview and live up to its standards of value.” 
(Pyszczynski et al., 2004, p. 436) 
Cultural worldviews help humans overcome the terror associated with their death by 
making them believe they are immortal, either figuratively or literally. Humans infer this 
immortality through connections with cultural institutions that promote and confirm their 
worldview. People perceive how connected they are with cultural institutions through 
their self-esteem – people with higher self-esteem are more strongly connected. Self-
esteem plays a key role in TMT because it is through self-esteem derived from social 
validation of their cultural worldview that people believe their worldview is “correct” and 
that they are socially connected. 
Self-esteem is developed by the internalization of cultural worldviews through the 
socialization process. This means that self-esteem is based on a shared cultural context 
and will need social validation from others in society. Social validation of cultural 
worldviews is accomplished through the social comparisons process (Festinger, 1954). 
When other people in one’s culture (or social group) agree with a person’s worldview, it 
 14 
implies that their worldview is correct and is based on an external reality. People will 
have a higher self-esteem when they feel that their worldview is justified. When people 
disagree with a one’s worldview, a person feels threatened and experiences a heightened 
level of anxiety, which contributes to lower self-esteem. Self-esteem, at its core, is a 
culturally derived defense mechanism that is dependent on social validation. 
 Fear of death, unsurprisingly, provokes anxiety. According to TMT, socially 
validating one’s worldview and meeting the standards of one’s social group best reduce 
anxiety. If successful, this process elevates self-esteem. Though self-esteem serves other 
purposes, such as feeling good about the self, TMT proposes that the main purpose of 
self-esteem is to buffer people from anxiety associated with fear of their mortality. Indeed 
one of the original TMT studies (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burling, 
& Lyon, 1992) has shown that elevated self-esteem does precisely this – it buffers against 
anxiety associated with thoughts of death. This finding has been replicated (e.g., 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Pinel, Simon, & Jordan, 1993). There is little debate 
over the anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem against thoughts of death (for review, 
see Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). 
 According to TMT, simply identifying with cultural institutions should also 
attenuate anxiety associated with thinking about death. Cultural institutions help people 
feel that their lives have meaning, and this feeling of existential meaningfulness should 
reduce anxiety associated with the fear of dying. People made to think about their death 
should therefore try to identify with their society or a cultural institution in an effort to 
confirm their cultural worldview. TMT research supports this assumption – mortality 
salience strengthens expressions of societal cultural identification (Arndt, Greenberg, 
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Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002; Castano, 2004; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & 
Sacchi, 2002). 
While the results of TMT studies cannot easily be disputed, there have been a 
variety of criticisms of the theory (see, Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; McGregor, 2006; 
Van den Bos, 2009; Van den Bos, Poortvliet, Mass, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005; for 
a rebuttal see, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006). For example, 
Proulx and Heine (2006; Heine, MacKay, Proulx, & Charles, 2005) propose that their 
meaning maintenance model can explain the effects of mortality salience, and McGregor 
(2006) proposes that a neurologically grounded account can explain why people identify 
zealously with ideologies and groups in response to mortality salience and other threats. 
However, most criticisms revolve around the manipulation of mortality salience.  
 One of the major questions focuses on the extent to which mortality salience 
creates terror and/or existential uncertainty (for a recent review see, Van den Bos, 2009). 
McGregor (2006), Van den Bos and colleagues (Van den Bos, 2009; Yavuz & Van den 
Bos, 2009), and Hogg and colleagues (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010; Hogg, Hohman, 
& Rivera, 2008; Hohman & Hogg, 2011) have all argued that thoughts of death produce 
stronger identification and defensive reactions not because people are terrified over their 
impending death but rather because of the uncertainty surrounding death – although our 
own death is the only true certitude in our lives, how it will happen and what happens 
afterwards is uncertain. According to McGregor (2006) and Van den Bos (2009), 
uncertainty is highly anxiety provoking and it is this anxiety provoked by uncertainty that 
motivates people to identify and defend their groups.  
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However, Pyszczynski and colleagues (2006) disagree that uncertainty is the most 
unsettling aspect of death. They claim it is the inevitability of death that causes the 
anxiety associate with mortality salience. They also argue that not all types of uncertainty 
are anxiety provoking – after all, people can sometimes seek out uncertainty (e.g., base 
jumpers, sky divers, gamblers), making the construct of uncertainty too vague to be a 
viable predictor of specific behavior.  
Pyszczynski and colleagues (2006) also claim that results from Van de Bos and 
colleagues’ studies (Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos & Miedma, 2000; Van den Bos, 
Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005) are problematic because their 
dependent variable is procedural justice. However, other studies by Van den Bos and 
colleagues do in fact use different dependent variables and replicate the effects obtained 
on procedural justice (Van den Bos et al., 2005, Experiments 3 and 4; Yavuz & Van den 
Bos, 2009). TMT researchers claim they cannot replicate Van den Bos’s results. Using 
Van den Bos and colleagues’ (Van den Bos et al., 2005) manipulation of uncertainty with 
TMT dependent measures, (Friedman & Arndt, 2005); however, Yavuz and Van den Bos 
(2009) have been able to replicate their findings in a Turkish population. 
Although Pyszczynski et al.’s (2006) concern over the way the effects of 
uncertainty are measured may be warranted, their dismissal of the role of uncertainty is 
less convincing. Death is inevitable; there is no uncertainty about whether or not it will 
happen– everyone dies. However, for most of us for most of our lives there is substantial 
uncertainty about when it will happen, what it will feel like to die, and above all, about 
what happens to us after death. Mortality salience may well make people frightened about 
dying, but it also raises substantial existential uncertainty focused on what happens to us 
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after we die (Van den Bos, 2009). It is perhaps no accident that religions and religious 
ideologies are so powerful and prevalent – among other things, religions have elaborate 
and sophisticated myths about ultimate causality and the nature of existence that 
effectively resolve existential uncertainty (see Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). If 
thinking about one’s death causes both fear and uncertainty, how do we know which 
plays the main role in group identification and thus adherence to group ideologies?  
While results from empirical tests of uncertainty-identity theory clearly 
demonstrate the motivational power of general and self-uncertainty on group 
identification and associated phenomena (for review see Hogg, 2000, 2007), the 
uncertainty evoked in TMT studies is a very specific type of uncertainty – existential 
uncertainty and uncertainty about the afterlife (Boyd & Zimbardo, 1997; Martin, 1999). 
Ultimately, the question is, does mortality salience raise fear of death (which TMT 
predicts), or does it raise uncertainty surrounding the afterlife (which uncertainty-identity 
theory would predict)? If it has both effects, which is primarily motivating group 
identification, ideological adherence, and worldview defense? 
 According to TMT, “the terror management utility of meaning systems that 
promise literal immortality (e.g., heaven, reincarnation, nirvana) is rather obvious: they 
deny that death entails absolute annihilation or the end of one’s existence in a 
straightforward semantic and logical way” (Pyszczynski et al., 2006, p. 335). How would 
people respond if they were made certain there was no life after death? From TMT we 
would expect this to provoke extreme anxiety and motivate people to defend and identify 
with their cultural institutions. From uncertainty-identity theory we would expect the 
opposite. Those who are certain there is no afterlife are, by definition, are not uncertain – 
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they are very sure about what will happen, and will not be motivated to increase their 
identification with their cultural institution.  
Research conducted by Hohman and Hogg (2011) explored this idea across two 
studies. In experiment 1, mortality salience was manipulated and uncertainty about the 
afterlife measured to predict national identification. As hypothesized, mortality salience 
strengthened identification only among those uncertain about the afterlife. In experiment 
2, mortality salience was manipulated as before, but belief in an afterlife also was 
manipulated – participants were primed to believe there was an afterlife, there was not an 
afterlife, or the existence of an afterlife was uncertain. As in experiment 1, mortality 
salience strengthened identification only among the existentially uncertain. These 
experiments show that uncertainty plays a significant role in reactions to mortality 
salience, and support uncertainty-identity theory’s analysis of the role of self-uncertainty 
in ideological conviction and group behavior. However, it is not clear if it is existential 
uncertainty or uncertainty in general that plays the important role in TMT and the 
buffering effects of self-esteem on MS (which is central to TMT) were not taken into 
account in these studies. As well, the typical TMT dependent variable (defense of one’s 
worldview) was not the dependent measure in the Hohman and Hogg study; rather 
identification with worldview was measured. Taken together there are still several 
unresolved questions that need to be addressed to unravel the relationship between 
uncertainty and mortality salience.  
The Current Research 
 This dissertation tests the general hypothesis derived from uncertainty-identity 
theory, that it is uncertainty and not fear of death or pursuit of self-esteem that motivates 
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people to identify with groups and defend their groups; and that identification with a 
group mediates the relationship between uncertainty and defense of the group. These 
experiments will demonstrate the unique role of uncertainty in group identification 
beyond fear of death or self-esteem and extend the research that was initiated by Hogg 
and Svensson (2012) and Hohman and Hogg (2011). 
To investigate this idea three experiments were conducted. TMT terminology will 
be used in the following experiments in order to keep the studies as close as possible to 
the standard TMT study. Therefore, group identification will also be referred to as 
identification with cultural institutions and defense of the ingroup will also be referred to 
as defense of cultural institutions. The cultural institution used in this research is America 
and future discussion in this dissertation will refer to identification with America and 
defense of America. America was used as the cultural institution to keep the experiments 
consistent with Hohman and Hogg (2011).  
 Experiment 1 provides a more complete examination of the relationship between 
uncertainty and self-esteem on group identification and defense of the ingroup. The 
general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, is that uncertainty will increase 
defense of America and that this relationship will be mediated by identification with 
America, regardless of self-esteem. Self-esteem and uncertainty were the independent 
variables and both were manipulated. Uncertainty was manipulated using the standard 
uncertainty-identity theory manipulation (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & 
Moffitt, 2007). Self-esteem was manipulated using the procedures in early TMT studies 
(e.g., Greenberg and colleagues, 1992). The key dependent variable, defense of America 
when criticized by outgroup members, was measured using the standard TMT measure 
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(Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992) and the mediating variable, 
identification with America, was measured using the items from Hohman and Hogg 
(2011).  
Experiment 2 replicates and extends the typical TMT study, that self-esteem will 
buffer against the effects of mortality salience on defense of cultural institutions, with the 
additional test of the mediating effects of identification with the cultural institution 
between mortality salience and defense of one’s cultural institution. Participants’ self-
esteem and mortality salience were manipulated using the methods detailed in the 
original studies conducted by Greenberg and colleagues (1992, 1997). The key dependent 
measure was defense of America as a cultural institution and the mediating variable was 
identification with America.  
Finally Experiment 3 is a combination of both Experiment 1 and 2, i.e. this 
experiment is a 2 (self-esteem – positive v. neutral) X 2 (mortality salience – salient v. 
control) X 2 (uncertainty – uncertain v. certain) factorial design with defense of America 
as the main dependent variable and identification with America as the meditating 
variable. The general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, is that uncertainty will 
moderate the relationship between MS and self-esteem on national defense and nation 
identification – such that we should only expect the typical TMT results under high but 
not low uncertainty. In contrast, TMT would predict an interaction between mortality 
salience and self-esteem – all participants, irrespective of their self-uncertainty, will 
defend America more under neutral self-esteem and mortality salience than under high 
self-esteem or when mortality is not made salient. 
CHAPTER TWO 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and Design. Forty-five male and 67 female participants (N = 112, 
mean age = 37.22, SD = 13.37) were recruited from mturk to participate in a study hosted 
on the Survey Gizmo website (an internet database for online studies). The sample was 
restricted to only American citizens because the main dependent measures were aimed at 
American citizens, thus non-American citizens who passed the protocol on mturk were 
removed from the final analyses (N = 8). There were two manipulated predictor variables 
– one was uncertainty, invoked by the standard UIT manipulation. Participants were 
randomly assigned to a high or low uncertainty condition.  The other manipulated 
variable was self-esteem – using procedures outlined in Greenberg and colleagues (1992, 
1997) participants were randomly assigned to a neutral or enhanced self-esteem 
condition. The key dependent variable was defense of America using the typical measure 
in TMT studies (Greenberg et al., 1992, 1997) and the mediating variable was a multi-
item scale measuring how strongly participants identified with America (cultural 
institution). 
Procedure and Measures. The research was introduced as a two-part study, the 
first of which deals with personality and opinions and values, and the second of which 
deals with people’s reactions to foreigners’ views and opinions of America. Participants 
were told that they would be asked to complete a short personality test and answer a few 
questions for the first part and then in the second part were told that they would be asked 
to read a few essays written by foreigners about America and answer a few questions. 
Before the self-esteem manipulation participants answered 13 true/false questions about 
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themselves (adapted from Forer, 1949) and were told that their answer to these questions 
will be used to create their personality assessment (see Appendix A for questions). 
The self-esteem manipulation was presented as a psychological assessment report 
(see Appendix B). The reports (one for neutral self-esteem and one for enhanced self-
esteem) were created using the same wording and procedures as Greenberg and 
colleagues (1992). For the neutral assessment condition participants read, "while you 
have some personality weaknesses, you are generally able to compensate for them" and 
"some of your aspirations may be a bit unrealistic." Similarly, in the enhanced esteem 
condition, it stated, "while you may feel that you have some personality weaknesses, your 
personality is fundamentally strong" and "most of your aspirations tend to be pretty 
realistic." After this manipulation participants answered two questions to ensure that the 
self-esteem manipulation was realized correctly – “rate on a scale of one (poor) to seven 
(perfect) how effective the personality test is in revealing personality” and “rate on a 
scale of one (not at all) to seven (completely) the degree to which the personality 
description reveals basic characteristics of your personality”. 
To manipulate uncertainty participants were asked to “please take a few minutes 
and think about those aspects in your life that make you feel the most uncertain/certain 
about yourself, your future or your place in the world. Then please list/write three of 
those below.” These questions were adapted from previous UIT studies (Hogg et al., 
2007; Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010) that have successfully manipulated self-
uncertainty. 
 After the uncertainty manipulation participants completed the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988, see Appendix C 
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for items) as a filler task before the dependent measures. The purpose of this filler task 
was to keep the methods and procedures of Experiment 1 as similar as possible to 
Experiment 2 and the standard TMT study. The PANAS is a 20-item scale comprising of 
two 10-item subsets that are averaged to create two scales, one to measure positive affect 
(α = .76) and the other negative affect (α = .69). 
The mediating variable was participants’ strength of identification as an 
American. Eight items adapted from previous research measuring group identification 
tapped American identification (e.g., Hogg & Hains, 1998; Hogg et al., 2007; Hohman & 
Hogg, 2011). Participants indicated (1 not very much, 9 very much) how much they 
would stand up for America, how much they identified with being American, how much 
of a feeling of belonging they had as an American, how important to their sense of self 
being American was, how much they liked Americans as a whole, how similar they felt 
to Americans, how well they felt they fit as an American, and what their overall 
impression of America was (this item 1 not very favorable, 9 very favorable), α = .94.  
After answering questions about their American identity participants proceeded 
onto the second part of the study which concerns reactions to foreigners’ views of 
America and were reminded that their task would be to read a couple essays and answer a 
few questions. One essay was pro-America and the other was anti-America (presentation 
of the essays was counter balanced; essays taken from Greenberg et al., 1992; see 
Appendix D for essays). After reading each essay participants answered five evaluation 
questions of the essay (adapted from Greenberg et al., 1997). These questions measured 
participants’ evaluation of the author (the extent to which participants liked the author, 
thought the author was intelligent, and thought the author was knowledgeable) and two 
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items that assessed the participants' evaluations of each of the essays (the extent to which 
the participants agreed with the author's opinions and how true they thought the author's 
opinion was), all questions are on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9 = totally), α = .87 for 
positive essay and α = .92 for negative essay. For statistical analyses a composite was 
made of these two essay evaluations. First an overall evaluation was made for each essay 
by averaging the five questions. Then the anti-essay score was subtracted from the pro-
essay score to create the evaluation composite with positive scores indicating preference 
of the pro-essay over the anti-essay. 
The final section of the questionnaire obtained demographic information (i.e. 
gender, age, education and ethnicity) and background information on political ideology, 
political party affiliation, and religious affiliation. To measure political ideology 
participants indicated their current political ideology (1 liberal, 9 conservative). They 
also checked their political party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, no party affiliation, 
other). For religious affiliation, participants indicated which the religion with which they 
most strongly identify.   
Results 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (self-esteem – positive v. neutral) X 2 (uncertainty – 
uncertain v. certain) factorial design with defense of America as the main dependent 
variable and identification with America as the mediator. The general hypothesis for this 
experiment, from uncertainty-identity theory, was that uncertainty would increase 
defense of America and that this relationship would be mediated by identification with 
America, regardless of self-esteem. A variety of background and demographic 
information was also measured. 
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Background Variables. Most participants had some college experience (8.9% high 
school diploma, 48.2% some college no degree, 29.5% bachelor degree, and 13.4% 
graduate degree) and the sample was predominately Caucasian (81.3% Caucasian, 2.7% 
Hispanic, 5.2% Multi-racial, 5.4% Asian, and 5.4% African American) – in both cases, 
proportions did not significantly differ as a function of the self-esteem or uncertainty 
manipulations. In terms of political ideology the sample was relatively moderate (M = 
4.71 SD  = 2.60) and 46 identified with the Democratic party, 27 with the Republican 
party, 35 did not identify with a party, and 4 identified with a third party. For religious 
affiliation, 16 identified themselves as Catholic, 7 Jewish, 20 Protestant, 2 Buddhist, 6 
Baptist, 20 Christian, 7 spiritual, 6 other, and 28 atheist. Proportions of religious 
affiliation and political party identity did not differ as a function of the uncertainty or 
self-esteem manipulations.  
 A two-way, uncertainty by self-esteem ANOVA on age and political ideology 
revealed no main effects or interactions. Entry of these background variables as 
covariates in the ANOVAs reported below did not significantly change the results. 
Self-esteem Manipulation Check. To ensure that the self-esteem manipulation was 
realized correctly participants answered two questions – one asking how revealing the 
personality assessment was of their personality and the other about how effective the 
assessment was at uncovering their personality. A two-way, uncertainty by self-esteem 
ANOVA on the effectiveness of the personality test revealed only a main effect for self-
esteem, F(1, 108) = 14.97, p < .001. Participants believed the assessment was more 
effective in the high self-esteem condition than the neutral self-esteem condition (M = 
6.18, SD = 1.70 vs. M = 4.79, SD = 2.10).  A second two-way, uncertainty by self-esteem 
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ANOVA on how revealing the test was of their personality uncovered a main effect for 
self-esteem (F(1, 108) = 13.01, p < .001) and a main effect for uncertainty (F(1, 108) = 
4.59, p = .034), there was no significant interaction between self-esteem and uncertainty. 
Participants believed the test was more revealing of their personality in the high self-
esteem condition than the neutral self-esteem condition (M = 6.34, SD = 1.41 vs. M = 
5.11, SD = 2.17) and participants believed the personality test was more revealing in the 
low uncertainty compared to high uncertainty condition (M = 6.08, SD = 1.79 vs. M = 
5.36, SD = 1.99). Entered as a covariate in the analyses reported below, the manipulation 
check did not significantly alter the results. Across the two questions the results suggest 
that the self-esteem manipulation was realized successfully by participants. 
Filler Task - PANAS. We provided a filler task between the manipulation and the 
dependent measure to ensure that the procedures from Experiment 1 were similar to 
Experiment 2. Results of a two-way ANOVA on the positive and negative PANAS scales 
found that the uncertainty and self-esteem manipulations or their interaction had no effect 
on people’s affect. 
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Figure 1. Experiment 1: National identification as a function of uncertainty and self-
esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05. 
National Identification. A two-way, uncertainty by self-esteem, ANOVA on 
national identification only revealed a significant main effect for uncertainty (F(1, 108) = 
8.93, p = .003), there was no main effect for self-esteem (F(1, 108) = .161, p = .689) and 
no interaction between self-esteem and uncertainty (F(1, 108) = .769, p = .382), see 
Figure 1. As predicted, participants in the high uncertainty condition significantly 
identified greater with America (M = 7.51, SD = 1.20) than those participants in the low 
uncertainty condition (M = 6.61, SD = 1.88).  
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Figure 2. Experiment 1: Essay evaluation change as a function of uncertainty and self-
esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05. 
Essay Evaluation. A two-way, uncertainty by self-esteem, ANOVA on the 
difference between the two essays only revealed a significant main effect for uncertainty 
(F(1, 108) = 4.46, p = .037), there was no main effect for self-esteem (F(1, 108) = 1.23, p 
= .270) and no interaction between self-esteem and uncertainty (F(1, 108) = .56, p = 
.456), see Figure 2. As predicted, uncertainty significantly increased the pro-essay 
evaluation over the anti-essay evaluation (M = 3.12, SD = 2.07) compared to those 
participants in the low uncertainty condition (M = 2.11, SD = 2.91).  
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Figure 3. Experiment 1: Identification with America mediating the relationship between 
uncertainty and defense of America. Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Mediation Analysis. A mediation analysis was conducted to determine if national 
identification mediated the relationship between uncertainty and essay evaluation change 
following the methods of Baron and Kenny (1986). National identity and essay 
evaluation change were significantly associated (β = .626, t = 8.42, p < .001), and 
uncertainty significantly affected both national identification (β = .275, t = 3.00, p = .003) 
and essay evaluation change (path c; β = .197, t = 2.11, p = .037). However, with national 
identification entered in the model uncertainty no longer significantly predicted essay 
evaluation change (path c’, β = .027, t = .352, ns; sobel z = 2.82, p = .005). Thus, national 
identification fully mediated the relationship between uncertainty and essay evaluation 
change (see Figure 3). 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provides a complete examination of the relationship between 
uncertainty and self-esteem on group identification and defense of the ingroup. The 
general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, was that uncertainty will increase 
defense of America and that this relationship will be mediated by identification with 
America, regardless of self-esteem. Research by Hogg and Svensson (2012) first tested 
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the relationship between self-esteem and uncertainty on identification; however, a 
limitation to that study was that there was no direct test of the causal relationship between 
self-esteem and uncertainty. This experiment provided that causal analysis and results 
demonstrated that regardless of self-esteem, participants identified more strongly with 
and defended America more when they were uncertain. As well, identification with 
America mediated the relationship between uncertainty and defense of America.  
The inclusion of defense of America as a dependent measure provides a unique 
contribution to the UIT literature, as no study to date has explored the effects of 
uncertainty on defending one’s ingroup. Though the implication could clearly be made 
from social identity theory that we would expect an increase in defending one’s groups 
under high uncertainty – and that is exactly what the results of this study demonstrated. 
These results also suggest that uncertainty plays a more important role in identification 
than self-esteem. Hogg and Svensson (2012) suggested this and this study further bolsters 
the idea that it is uncertainty not self-esteem that plays a key role in motivating people to 
identify with and defend their ingroup. However, uncertainty is not the only theory that 
has been utilized to predict group motivation – TMT as well has been applied to this 
domain. The second experiment was designed to replicate experiment 1 in the context of 
the TMT paradigm.  
CHAPTER THREE 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 provided a replication of the typical TMT study, that self-esteem 
would buffer against the effects of mortality salience on defense of cultural institutions, 
with the additional test of the mediating effects of identification with the cultural 
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institution. Participants’ self-esteem and mortality salience were manipulated using the 
methods detailed in the original studies conducted by Greenberg and colleagues (1992, 
1997). The key dependent measure was defense of America as a cultural institution and 
the mediating variable was identification with America. According to TMT, we should 
expect an increase in defense of American when mortality is made salient, however 
increasing self-esteem will buffer against this effect under conditions of heightened self-
esteem there would not be an increase in defense of America. Additionally, this 
experiment examined if participants increase in defense was due to an increase in 
identification with America. Based on social identity theory participants will only 
strengthen their defense of their ingroup to the extent that they identified with the group, 
therefore the increased defense of one’s ingroup demonstrated in TMT studies can be 
attributed to mortality salience causing an increase in identification.  
Method 
Participants and Design. Forty-five male and 67 female participants (N = 112, 
mean age = 33.62, SD = 13.39) were recruited from mturk to participate in a study hosted 
on the Survey Gizmo website (an internet database for online studies). Eighteen non-
American citizens who got through the protocol on mturk were removed from the final 
analyses. There were two manipulated predictor variables. Mortality salience (MS) was 
invoked by the standard TMT manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to the 
MS condition or control condition (thinking about watching television).  The second 
manipulated variable was self-esteem – using procedures outlined by Greenberg and 
colleagues, participants were randomly assigned to a neutral or enhanced self-esteem 
condition. The key dependent variable is defense of America using the typical measure in 
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TMT studies (Greenberg et al., 1992, 1997) and the mediating variable was a multi-item 
scale measuring how strongly participants identified with America. 
Procedure and Measures. The research was introduced as a two-part study, the 
first dealing with personality and opinions and values, and the second of which dealing 
with people’s reactions to foreigners’ views and opinions of America. Participants were 
told that they would be asked to complete a short personality test and answer a few 
questions for the first part and then in the second part were told that they would be asked 
to read a few essays written by foreigners about America and answer a few questions. 
Before the self-esteem manipulation participants answered 13 true/false questions about 
themselves (adapted from Forer, 1949) and were told that their answer to these questions 
would be used to create their personality assessment (see Appendix A for questions). 
The self-esteem manipulation was presented as a psychological assessment report. 
The reports (one for neutral self-esteem and one for enhanced self-esteem) were created 
using the same wording as Greenberg and colleagues (1992) and was the same 
manipulation used in the first experiment. For the neutral assessment condition 
participants read, "while you have some personality weaknesses, you are generally able 
to compensate for them" and "some of your aspirations may be a bit unrealistic." 
Similarly, in the enhanced esteem condition, it stated, "while you may feel that you have 
some personality weaknesses, your personality is fundamentally strong" and "most of 
your aspirations tend to be pretty realistic." After this manipulation participants answered 
two questions to ensure that the self-esteem manipulation was realized correctly – “rate 
on a scale of one (poor) to seven (perfect) how effective the personality test is in 
revealing personality” and “rate on a scale of one (not at all) to seven (completely) the 
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degree to which the personality description reveals basic characteristics of your 
personality”. 
To manipulate MS, participants answered “please briefly describe the emotions 
that the thought of your death(MS)/watching television(control)/ arouses in you” and 
“please write down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you 
physically die/watch television and once you are physically dead/watching television”. 
These questions were taken from previous TMT studies (see, McGregor, Zana, Holmes, 
& Spence, 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 2004) in which mortality salience had been 
successfully manipulated.  
 After the MS manipulation participants completed the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; see Appendix B for 
questions) as a filler task before the dependent measures. TMT studies typically do this 
(e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Schimel, 1999; Dechesne, Janssen, & 
Van Knippenberg, 2000) in order to allow sufficient time for the MS manipulation to 
impact participants’ thoughts of death. The PANAS is a 20-item scale comprising of two 
10-item subsets that are averaged to create two scales, one to measure positive affect (α = 
.82) and the other negative affect (α = .79). 
 The mediating variable was participants’ strength of identification as an 
American. Eight items adapted from previous research measuring group identification 
tapped American identification (e.g., Hogg & Hains, 1998; Hogg et al., 2007; Hohman & 
Hogg, 2011). Participants indicated (1 not very much, 9 very much) how much they 
would stand up for America, how much they identified with being American, how much 
of a feeling of belonging they had as an American, how important to their sense of self 
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being American was, how much they liked Americans as a whole, how similar they felt 
to Americans, how well they felt they fit as an American, and what their overall 
impression of America was (this item 1 not very favorable, 9 very favorable), α = .95.  
After answering questions about their American identity participants proceed onto 
the second part of the study which concerns reactions to foreigners’ views of America 
and were reminded that their task will be to read a couple essays and answer a few 
questions. One essay was pro-America and the other was anti-America (presentation of 
the essays was counter balanced, see Greenberg et al., 1992; see Appendix C for the 
essays). After reading each essay participants answered five evaluation questions of the 
essay (adapted from Greenberg et al., 1997). These questions measured participants’ 
evaluation of the author (the extent to which participants liked the author, thought the 
author was intelligent, and thought the author was knowledgeable) and two items that 
assessed the participants' evaluations of each of the essays (the extent to which the 
participants agreed with the author's opinions and how true they thought the author's 
opinion was), all questions are on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9 = totally), α = .90 for 
positive essay and α = .95 for negative essay. For statistical analyses a composite was 
made of these two essay evaluations. First an overall evaluation was made for each essay 
by averaging the five questions. Then the anti-essay score was subtracted from the pro-
essay score to create the evaluation composite with positive scores indicating preference 
of the pro-essay over the anti-essay. The final section of the questionnaire obtained the 
same demographic information and background information as Experiment 1. 
Results 
Experiment 2 was a 2 (self-esteem – positive v. neutral) X 2 (mortality salience – 
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MS v. control) factorial design with defense of America as the main dependent variable 
and identification with America as the mediating variable. The hypotheses tested was that 
self-esteem would buffer against the effects of mortality salience on defense of the group, 
and that identification with the group would mediate the relationship between mortality 
salience and defense of the group. A number of background and demographic 
information were also measured. 
Background Variables. Most participants had some college education (2.7% high 
school diploma, 44.1% some college no degree, 34.2% bachelor degree, and 18.9% 
graduate degree) and the sample was predominately Caucasian (82.7% Caucasian, 2.7% 
Hispanic, .9% Multi-racial, 10.9% Asian, and 1.8% African American) – in both cases, 
proportions did not differ significantly as a function of the self-esteem or mortality 
salience manipulations. In terms of political ideology the sample was relatively moderate 
(M = 4.82, SD  = 2.23) and 33 identified with the Democratic party, 28 with the 
Republican party, 46 did not identify with a party, and 6 identified with a third party. For 
religious affiliation, 14 identified themselves as Catholic, 4 Jewish, 26 Protestant, 1 
Buddhist, 4 Baptist, 15 Christian, 14 spiritual, 12 other, and 22 atheist. Proportions of 
religious affiliation and political party identity did not differ as a function of the mortality 
salience or self-esteem manipulations.  
 A two-way, mortality salience by self-esteem ANOVA on age and political 
ideology revealed no main effects; however there were significant interactions between 
mortality salience and self-esteem for both age and political ideology. Investigation of the 
simple main effects of the interaction on age revealed that participants were younger (M 
= 29.35, SD = 11.47) in the mortality salience condition under high self-esteem compared 
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to low self-esteem (M =36.85, SD = 14.25), no other conditions differed on age. 
Investigation of the simple main effects of the interaction on political ideology revealed 
that participants were more conservative (M = 5.33, SD = 2.18) in the high self-esteem 
condition in the control condition compared to the mortality salience condition (M =4.13, 
SD = 2.03), no other conditions differed. Entry of these background variables as 
covariates in the ANOVAs reported below did not significantly change the results. 
Self-esteem Manipulation Check. To ensure that the self-esteem manipulation was 
realized correctly participants answered two questions – one asking how revealing the 
personality assessment was of their personality and the other about how effective the 
assessment was at uncovering their personality. A two-way, mortality salience by self-
esteem ANOVA on the effectiveness of the personality test revealed only a main effect 
for self-esteem, F(1, 108) = 6.98, p = .009. Participants believed the assessment was 
more effective in the high self-esteem condition than the neutral self-esteem condition (M 
= 6.11, SD = 1.60 vs. M = 5.22, SD = 1.91). A second Two-way, mortality salience by 
self-esteem ANOVA on how revealing the test was of their personality only uncovered a 
main effect for self-esteem, F(1, 108) = 9.18, p = .003. Participants believed the test was 
more revealing of their personality in the high self-esteem condition than the neutral self-
esteem condition (M = 6.45, SD = 1.55 vs. M = 5.43, SD = 1.88). Based on these results 
the self-esteem manipulation was realized successfully.  
Filler Task - PANAS. A filler task was provided between the manipulation and the 
dependent measure to ensure that the prime had time to cognitively embed thoughts of 
death. Previous research (Van den Bos et al., 2005) had found that mortality salience 
should not have an effect on people’s affect. Results of a two-way ANOVA on the 
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positive and negative PANAS scales found an interaction between mortality salience and 
self-esteem on both positive affect and negative affect. Investigation of the simple main 
effects of the interaction on positive affect revealed that participants had greater positive 
affect (M = 2.73, SD = .78) in the high self-esteem condition under mortality salience 
compared to the control condition (M =2.08, SD = .59), no other conditions differed. 
Investigation of the simple main effects of the interaction on negative affect revealed that 
participants had greater negative affect (M = 2.19, SD = .76) in the high self-esteem 
condition under mortality salience compared to the control condition (M = 1.72, SD = 
.53), no other conditions differed. Entry of these background variables as covariates in 
the ANOVAs reported below did not significantly change the results. 
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Figure 4. Experiment 2: National identification as a function of mortality salience and 
self-esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05. 
National Identification. A two-way, mortality salience by self-esteem, ANOVA 
on national identification uncovered no significant main effects. However, there was a 
significant interaction, F(1, 108) = 5.37, p = .022 (see Figure 4). As predicted, mortality 
salience significantly strengthened national identification among participants who were in 
the neutral compared to high self-esteem condition, F(1, 108) = 5.53, p = .02. There was 
no significant difference between the esteem conditions in the mortality salience control 
condition (F(1, 108) = .98, ns). Investigation of the simple main effect of mortality 
salience within each self-esteem condition revealed that there was a significant difference 
between the mortality salience conditions under the neutral self-esteem condition (F(1, 
108) = 4.17, p = .044) but not under the high self-esteem condition (F(1, 108) = .74, ns). 
 39 
 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2: Essay evaluation difference as a function of mortality salience 
and self-esteem. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05. 
Essay Evaluation. A two-way, mortality salience by self-esteem, ANOVA on the 
difference between the two essays uncovered no significant main effects. However, there 
was a significant interaction, F(1, 108) = 3.95, p = .049 (see Figure 5). As predicted, 
mortality salience significantly increased the pro-essay evaluation over the anti-essay 
evaluation among participants who were in the neutral compared to high self-esteem 
condition, F(1, 108) = 7.97, p = .006. There was no significant difference between the 
esteem conditions under the mortality salience control condition (F(1, 108) = .01, ns). 
Investigation of the simple main effect of mortality salience within each self-esteem 
condition revealed that there was no significant difference between the mortality salience 
conditions under the neutral self-esteem condition (F(1, 108) = 1.73, p = .19) and under 
the high self-esteem condition (F(1, 108) = 2.34, p = .13). 
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Figure 6. Experiment 2: Identification with America mediating the relationship between 
mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of America. Notes. * p < .05, ** p < .01, 
*** p < .001; MS = mortality salient; SE = self-esteem. 
Mediation Analysis. Following Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007), moderated 
mediation analyses were conducted to examine the conditional indirect effect of national 
identification on the interaction of mortality salience and self-esteem on essay evaluation. 
This approach has several advantages over the traditional Baron and Kenny (1986) 
method (see Hayes, 2009; Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010) and was used 
in this experiment over the method used in the first because this method allows to test for 
a mediation when there is an interaction between two variables on both the mediator and 
dependent measures (Preacher et. al, 2007). National identity and essay evaluation 
change were significantly associated (β = .599, t = 7.85, p < .001), and the interaction 
between mortality salience and self-esteem significantly affected both national 
identification (R2 = .062, ΔR2 = .047, F(1, 108) = 5.37, p = .022, β = .216, t = 2.32, p = 
.022) and essay evaluation change (path c; R2 = .071, ΔR2 = .034, F(1, 108) = 3.95, p = 
.049, β = .184, t = 1.99, p = .049). However, with national identification entered in the 
model the interaction between mortality salience and self-esteem no longer significantly 
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predicts essay evaluation change (path c’, β = .06, t = .776, ns). Examining this 
mediation, the conditional indirect effect of national identification on essay evaluation 
remained significant for mortality salience under neutral self-esteem (z = -1.95, p = .05), 
whereas it was not significant under high self-esteem (z = 1.29, p = .196). Thus, national 
identification mediated the interactive effect of mortality salience and self-esteem on 
essay evaluation (see Figure 6). 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the typical TMT study, that self-esteem buffers against 
the effects of mortality salience on defense of the group, with the additional test of the 
mediating effect of identification on the relationship between mortality salience and 
defense of one’s group. As predicted, and in accordance with previous research, mortality 
salience only increased identification with America and defense of America when self-
esteem was not enhanced – enhancing self-esteem attenuated the effects of mortality 
salience. Also following predictions, but unique to the literature, the interactive effects of 
mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of America was mediated by identification 
with America.  According to social identity theory, defense of the ingroup should only 
increase to the extent that people identify with the group, and this was demonstrated with 
these results.  
One of the major questions surrounding TMT focuses on the extent to which 
mortality salience creates terror and/or existential uncertainty (for a recent review see, 
Van den Bos, 2009). McGregor (2006), Van den Bos and colleagues (Van den Bos, 2009; 
Yavuz & Van den Bos, 2009), and Hogg and colleagues (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 
2010; Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 2008; Hohman & Hogg, 2011) have all argued that 
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thoughts of death produce stronger identification and defensive reactions not because 
people are terrified over their impending death but rather because of the uncertainty 
surrounding death – although our own death is the only true certitude in our lives, how it 
will happen, what happens afterwards, and when it happens is uncertain. While the results 
of this experiment cannot be disputed (mortality salience does increase identification and 
ingroup defense), the underlying process is not explicitly tested and therefore we cannot 
be certain if fear of death or uncertainty account for the results. Therefore, experiment 3 
was designed to determine the effect of uncertainty on mortality salience, identification 
and defense of the ingroup by using an experimental design. By experimentally 
manipulating uncertainty, either making people more or less uncertain, we will be able to 
determine if uncertainty is the key underlying process that occurs when people think 
about their death. If uncertainty is the key process, in the low uncertainty condition we 
would not expect that thinking about one’s death would increase identification with or 
defense of the group. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was a combination of both Experiment 1 and 2: this experiment was 
a 2 (self-esteem – positive vs. neutral) X 2 (mortality salience – salient vs. control) X 2 
(uncertainty – low vs. high uncertainty) factorial design with defense of America as the 
main dependent variable and identification with America as the meditating variable. The 
general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, was that uncertainty would 
moderate the relationship between MS and self-esteem on national defense and nation 
identification – such that we should have only expected the typical TMT results under 
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high but not low uncertainty. In contrast, TMT would have predicted an interaction 
between mortality salience and self-esteem – all participants, irrespective of their 
uncertainty, would have defended America more under neutral self-esteem and mortality 
salience than under high self-esteem or when mortality was not made salient. 
Method 
Participants and Design. There were123 male and 171 female participants (N = 
294, mean age = 33.96, SD = 12.92) recruited from mturk to participate in a study hosted 
on the Survey Gizmo website (an internet database for online studies). Twenty-six non-
American citizens who got through the protocol on mturk were removed from the final 
analyses.  There were three manipulated predictor variables; self-esteem – using 
procedures outlined in Greenberg and colleagues (1992, 1997) participants were 
randomly assigned to a neutral or enhanced self-esteem condition. The second 
manipulated variable was uncertainty, invoked by the standard UIT manipulation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a high or low uncertainty condition. The final 
manipulated variable was MS, invoked by the standard TMT manipulation. Participants 
were randomly assigned to the MS condition or control condition (thinking about 
watching television).  The key dependent variable was defense of America using the 
typical measure in TMT studies (Greenberg et al., 1992, 1997) and the mediating variable 
was a multi-item scale measuring how strongly participants identified with America 
(cultural institution). 
Procedure and Measures. The procedures in Experiment 3 were the same as used 
in Experiments 1 and 2. Experiment 3 was introduced as a two-part study, the first of 
which deals with personality and opinions and values, and the second of which deals with 
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people’s reactions to foreigners’ views and opinions of America. Participants were told 
that they would be asked to complete a short personality test and answer a few questions 
for the first part and then in the second part were told that they will be asked to read a few 
essays written by foreigners about America and answer a few questions. Before the self-
esteem manipulation participants answered 13 true/false questions about themselves 
(adapted from Forer, 1949) and were told that their answer to these questions would be 
used to create their personality assessment. The same self-esteem manipulation from 
Experiment 1 and 2 was used in Experiment 3 (see Experiment 1 for details). The same 
manipulations from Experiment 1 (uncertainty) and Experiment 2 (MS) were used in 
Experiment 3 (see, Experiment 1 and 2 for manipulation details). The mortality salience 
and uncertainty manipulations were counterbalanced to ensure that order effects did not 
bias the results. Order of presentation had no effect on the results reported below. 
 After the uncertainty and mortality salience manipulations participants completed 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
as a filler task before the dependent measures. The PANAS is a 20-item scale comprising 
of two 10-item subsets that are averaged to create two scales, one to measure positive 
affect (α = .76) and the other negative affect (α = .74). 
The mediating variable was participants’ strength of identification as an American 
using the same eight items from Experiment 1, α = .95. After answering questions about 
their American identity participants were told that they would now proceed onto the 
second part of the study which concerns reactions to foreigners’ views of America and 
were reminded that their task will be to read a couple essays and answer a few questions. 
The same two essays (one pro-American and one anti-America) from Experiment 1 and 2 
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were used in Experiment 3. As well, the same questions following each essay were used 
(see Experiment 1 for details). A composite was made of these two essay evaluations, one 
for the pro-American essay (α = .91) and the other for the anti-American essay (α = .91). 
First an overall evaluation was made for each essay by averaging the five questions. Then 
the anti-essay score was subtracted from the pro-essay score to create the evaluation 
composite with positive scores indicating preference of the pro-essay over the anti-essay. 
The final section of the questionnaire obtained the same demographic information and 
background information as Experiment 1 and 2.   
Results 
Experiment 3 was a 2 (self-esteem – positive vs. neutral) X 2 (mortality salience – 
salient vs. control) X 2 (uncertainty – low vs. high uncertainty) factorial design with 
defense of America as the main dependent variable and identification with America as 
the meditating variable. The general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, is that 
uncertainty will moderate the relationship between MS and self-esteem on national 
defense and nation identification – such that we should only expect the typical TMT 
results under high but not low uncertainty. A number of background and demographic 
information were also measured. 
Background Variables. Most participants had a bachelors degree (13.7% high 
school diploma, 31.7% some college no degree, 10.6% associate degree, 33.1% bachelors 
degree, and 10.9% graduate degree) and the sample was predominately Caucasian (77% 
Caucasian, 4.8% Hispanic, 4.8% Multi-racial, 4.1% Asian, 7.5% African American, and 
1.7% declined to respond) – in both cases, proportions did not differ significantly as a 
function of the self-esteem, uncertainty, or mortality salience manipulations. In terms of 
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political ideology the sample was relatively moderate (M = 4.44, SD  = 2.17) and 100 
identified with the Democratic party, 50 with the Republican party, 127 did not identify 
with a party, and 13 identified with a third party. For religious affiliation, identified 
themselves as 37 Catholic, 2 Jewish, 41 Protestant, 2 Buddhist, 6 Baptist, 66 Christian, 2 
Muslim, 19 spiritual, 17 other, and 100 none. Proportions of religious affiliation and 
political party identity did not differ as a function of the mortality salience or self-esteem 
manipulations.  
 A three-way, uncertainty by mortality salience by self-esteem ANOVA on age 
and political ideology revealed no main effects, however there was a significant 
interaction between uncertainty and self-esteem on age. Investigation of the simple main 
effects of the interaction on age revealed that participants were older (M = 36.73, SD = 
15.17) in the high uncertainty condition under neutral self-esteem compared to high self-
esteem (M = 32.82, SD = 11.36). Under low uncertainty participants were older (M = 
35.95, SD = 12.73) under high self-esteem compared to neutral self-esteem (M = 30.99, 
SD = 11.72). Entry of these background variables as covariates in the ANOVAs reported 
below did not significantly change the results. 
Self-esteem Manipulation Check. To ensure that the self-esteem manipulation was 
realized correctly participants answered two questions – one asking how revealing the 
personality assessment was of their personality and the other about how effective the 
assessment was at uncovering their personality. A three-way, uncertainty by mortality 
salience by self-esteem ANOVA on the effectiveness of the personality test only revealed 
a main effect for self-esteem, F(1, 286) = 18.91, p < .001. Participants believed the 
assessment was more effective in the high self-esteem condition than the neutral self-
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esteem condition (M = 6.23, SD = 1.74 vs. M = 5.24, SD = 1.92). A second three-way, 
uncertainty by mortality salience by self-esteem ANOVA on how revealing the test was 
of their personality only uncovered a main effect for self-esteem, F(1, 286) = 16.73, p < 
.001. Participants believed the assessment was more revealing of their personality in the 
high self-esteem condition than the neutral self-esteem condition (M = 6.47, SD = 1.65 
vs. M = 5.55, SD = 1.91). Based on these results the self-esteem manipulation was 
realized successfully.  
Filler Task - PANAS. A filler task was provided between the manipulation and the 
dependent measure to ensure that the prime had time to cognitively embed thoughts of 
death. Results of a three-way (uncertainty by mortality salience by self-esteem) ANOVA 
on the positive and negative PANAS scales found an interaction between mortality 
salience and self-esteem on positive affect. Investigation of the simple main effects of the 
interaction on positive affect revealed that participants had greater positive affect (M = 
2.43, SD = .57) in the high self-esteem condition under the control condition compared to 
the mortality salience condition (M =2.22, SD = .69), as well under mortality salience 
participants in the neutral self-esteem condition had greater affect (M =2.36, SD = .65) 
than in the high self-esteem condition (M =2.22, SD = .69) – no other conditions differed. 
Entry of these background variables as covariates in the ANOVAs reported below did not 
significantly change the results. 
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Figure 7. Experiment 3: National identification as a function of uncertainty, self-esteem, 
and mortality salience. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05. 
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National Identification. A three-way, uncertainty by mortality salience by self-
esteem, ANOVA on national identification uncovered no significant main effects. 
However, there was a significant two-way interaction between mortality salience and 
self-esteem, F(1, 286) = 9.44, p = .002. Mortality salience significantly strengthened 
national identification among participants who were in the neutral (M = 6.82, SD = 1.82) 
compared to high self-esteem condition (M = 6.02, SD = 2.06), F(1, 286) = 4.69, p = 
.031. In the control condition the opposite occurred; people identified significantly more 
strongly with America under high self-esteem (M = 6.76, SD = 1.78) compared to neutral 
self-esteem (M = 6.17, SD = 1.82), F(1, 286) = 4.79, p = .029. Investigation of the simple 
main effect of mortality salience within each self-esteem condition revealed that there 
was a significant difference between the mortality salience conditions under the neutral 
self-esteem condition (F(1, 286) = 4.66, p = .032) and under the high self-esteem 
condition (F(1, 286) = 4.78, p = .03). 
This two-way interaction needs to be interpreted with caution because of a 
significant three-way interaction between uncertainty, mortality salience, and self-esteem, 
F(1, 286) = 9.59, p = .002 (see Figure 7). Investigation of the simple main effects for the 
difference between neutral self-esteem and high self-esteem uncovered significant 
differences under high uncertainty and mortality salience (F(1, 286) = 14.64, p < .001), 
participants identified more strongly with America under neutral self-esteem (M = 7.33, 
SD = 1.53) compared to high self-esteem (M = 5.66, SD = 2.21). As well, there was a 
significant difference for the high uncertainty and control condition (F(1, 286) = 5.79, p = 
.017); participants identified more strongly with America under high self-esteem (M= 
6.84, SD = 1.78)) than neutral self-esteem (M = 5.82, SD = 1.99). There were no 
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significant differences under low uncertainty and mortality salience (F(1, 286) = .268, ns) 
or the low uncertainty and the control condition (F(1, 286) = .383, ns). 
Analysis of the simple main effects for the difference between mortality salience 
and the control revealed a significant difference under high uncertainty and high self-
esteem (F(1, 286) = 7.67, p = .006), participants identified more strongly with America 
under the control condition (M = 6.84, SD = 1.78)) compared to mortality salience (M = 
5.66, SD = 2.21). As well, there was a significant difference for high uncertainty and 
neutral self-esteem (F(1, 286) = 312.07, p = .001), participants identified more strongly 
with America under mortality salience (M= 7.33, SD = 1.53) compare to the control (M = 
5.82, SD = 1.99). There were no significant differences under low uncertainty and neutral 
self-esteem (F(1, 286) = .214, ns) or high uncertainty and high self-esteem (F(1, 286) = 
.69, ns). 
Examination of the simple main effects for the difference between low and high 
uncertainty revealed only a significant difference under neutral self-esteem and mortality 
salience (F(1, 286) = 5.90, p = .016), participants identified more strongly with America 
under high (M = 7.33, SD = 1.53) than low uncertainty (M = 6.26, SD = 1.97). There was 
a marginal trend for high self-esteem and mortality salience (F(1, 286) = 3.09, p = .08), 
participants tended to identify more strongly with America under low (M= 6.51, SD = 
1.75) than high uncertainty (M = 5.66, SD = 2.21). There were no significant differences 
under neutral self-esteem and the control conditions (F(1, 286) = 2.29, ns) or high self-
esteem and the control condition (F(1, 286) = .124, ns). 
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Figure 8. Experiment 3: Essay evaluation change as a function of uncertainty, self-
esteem, and mortality salience. Notes. Bars not sharing the same letter differ at p < .05. 
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Essay Evaluation. A three-way, uncertainty by mortality salience by self-esteem, 
ANOVA on the difference between the two essays uncovered no significant main effects. 
However, there was a significant two-way interaction self-esteem and mortality salience, 
F(1, 286) = 4.07, p = .003. In the control condition participants significantly increased the 
pro-essay evaluation over the anti-essay evaluation among participants who were in the 
high self-esteem (M = 2.34, SD = 2.81) compared to the neutral self-esteem condition (M 
= 1.40, SD = 2.63), F(1, 15.60) = 7.97, p = .019. There was no significant difference 
between the esteem conditions under mortality salience (F(1, 286) = .650, ns). 
Investigation of the simple main effect of mortality salience within each self-esteem 
condition revealed that there was a significant difference between the mortality salience 
conditions under the neutral self-esteem condition (F(1, 286) = 5.95, p = .015) – 
participants significantly increased the pro-essay evaluation over the anti-essay 
evaluation under mortality salience (M = 2.43, SD = 2.32) compared to the control (M = 
1.40, SD = 2.63). There was no significant difference between mortality salience 
conditions under the high self-esteem condition (F(1, 286) = .412, ns). 
As predicted, there was a significant three-way interaction between uncertainty, 
mortality salience, and self-esteem, F(1, 286) = 5.48, p = .02 (see Figure 8). Investigation 
of the simple main effects for the difference between neutral self-esteem and high self-
esteem uncovered significant differences under high uncertainty and mortality salience 
(F(1, 286) = 5.22, p = .023), significantly increased the pro-essay evaluation over the 
anti-essay evaluation under neutral self-esteem (M = 3.04, SD = 2.15) compared to high 
self-esteem (M = 1.66, SD = 2.89). As well, there was a significant difference for the high 
uncertainty and control condition (F(1, 286) = 5.24, p = .023); participants significantly 
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increased the pro-essay evaluation over the anti-essay evaluation under high self-esteem 
(M= 2.14, SD = 2.70) than neutral self-esteem (M = .80, SD = 2.64). There were no 
significant differences under low uncertainty and mortality salience (F(1, 286) = .926, ns) 
or the low uncertainty and the control condition (F(1, 286) = 1.02, ns). 
Analysis of the simple main effects for the difference between mortality salience 
and the control revealed a significant difference under high uncertainty and neutral self-
esteem (F(1, 286) = 13.81, p < .001), participants significantly increased the pro-essay 
evaluation over the anti-essay evaluation under mortality salience (M = 3.04, SD = 2.15) 
compared to the control (M = .80, SD = 2.64). There were no significant differences 
under low uncertainty and neutral self-esteem (F(1, 286) = .093, ns), high uncertainty and 
high self-esteem (F(1, 286) = .658, ns), and low uncertainty and high self-esteem (F(1, 
286) = .015, ns). 
Examination of the simple main effects for the difference between low and high 
uncertainty revealed a significant difference under neutral self-esteem and mortality 
salience (F(1, 286) = 3.94, p = .048); participants significantly increased the pro-essay 
evaluation over the anti-essay evaluation under high (M = 3.04, SD = 2.15) than low 
uncertainty (M = 1.82, SD = 2.37). There was also a significant difference for neutral 
self-esteem and the mortality salience control (F(1, 286) = 4.30, p = .039); participants 
significantly increased the pro-essay evaluation over the anti-essay evaluation under low 
(M = 2.01, SD = 2.53) than high uncertainty (M = .80, SD = 2.64). There were no 
significant differences under high self-esteem and mortality salience (F(1, 286) = 1.48, 
ns) or high self-esteem and the control condition (F(1, 286) = .578, ns). 
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Figure 9. Experiment 3: Identification with America mediating the relationship between 
mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of America under high uncertainty. Notes. 
** p < .01, *** p < .001; MS = mortality salient; SE = self-esteem. 
Mediation Analysis. Following Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007), moderated 
mediation analyses were conducted to examine the conditional indirect effect of national 
identification on the interaction of uncertainty, mortality salience and self-esteem on 
essay evaluation. This approach has several advantages over the traditional Baron and 
Kenny (1986) method (see Hayes, 2009; Antonakis et al., 2010). National identity and 
essay evaluation change were significantly associated (β = .644, t = 14.39, p < .001), and 
the interaction between uncertainty, mortality salience and self-esteem significantly 
affected both national identification (R2 = .071, ΔR2 = .031, F(1, 286) = 9.59, p = .002, β 
= .78, t = 3.10, p = .002) and essay evaluation change (path c; R2 = .058, ΔR2 = .018, F(1, 
286) = 5.49, p = .02, β = .135, t = 2.34, p = .02). With national identification entered in 
the model the interaction between uncertainty, mortality salience, and self-esteem no 
longer significantly predicted essay evaluation change (path c’, β = .023, t = .495, ns). As 
well, following the method of Preacher and Hayes (2008), the indirect effect of the three-
way interaction on the essay evaluation difference through American identification 
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(indirect effect = 2.345) using the 20,000 bootstrap method produced a 95% confidence 
interval of .885 and 3.869 – the confidence interval does not include zero which suggest 
that the indirect effect is statistically significant. In order to explain the significant 
mediation of identification, two separate mediation moderation analyses were performed 
on the interaction between mortality salience and self-esteem on the essay difference 
through identification – one under high uncertainty and the other under low uncertainty. 
Under high uncertainty, the interaction between mortality salience and self-esteem 
significantly affected both national identification (R2 = .120, ΔR2 = .114, F(1, 143) = 
18.50, p < .001, β = .339, t = 4.30, p < .001) and essay evaluation change (path c; R2 = 
.087, ΔR2 = .063, F(1, 143) = 9.88, p = .002, β = .252, t = 3.14, p = .002). However, with 
national identification entered in the model the interaction between mortality salience and 
self-esteem no longer significantly predicted essay evaluation change (path c’, β = .011, t 
= .181, ns). Examining this mediation, the conditional indirect effect of national 
identification on essay evaluation remained significant for mortality salience under 
neutral self-esteem (z = 3.24, p = .001), whereas it was significant under high self-esteem 
(z = -2.62, p = .009), however it was in the opposite direction. As predicted, national 
identification mediated the interactive effect of mortality salience and self-esteem on 
essay evaluation under high uncertainty (see Figure 9). 
Under low uncertainty, the interaction between mortality salience and self-esteem 
did not significantly predict national identification (R2 = .008, ΔR2 < .001, F(1, 143) < 
.001, ns, β = .002, t = .018, ns) or essay evaluation change (path c; R2 = .016, ΔR2 < .001, 
F(1, 143) = .015, ns, β = .01, t = .124, ns). Because the interaction did not significantly 
predict the mediator or dependent variable there cannot be mediation and there is no 
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reason to test the indirect effects. Therefore, as predicted, national identification does not 
mediate the interactive effect of mortality salience and self-esteem on essay evaluation 
under low uncertainty. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested the general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, that 
uncertainty will moderate the relationship between MS and self-esteem on national 
defense and nation identification – such that we should only expect the typical TMT 
results (demonstrated in Experiment 2) under high but not low uncertainty. Exactly as 
predicted, under high uncertainty the typical TMT results are demonstrated – mortality 
salience increased identification with America and defense of America only when self-
esteem was not enhanced. As well, under high uncertainty, the interactive effects of 
mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of America were mediated by identification 
with America. However, under low uncertainty, mortality salience did not increase 
identification or defense of the ingroup nor did self-esteem buffer against the effects of 
MS. These results support the uncertainty-identity theory analysis of the role of 
uncertainty in the TMT paradigm and suggest that uncertainty is a key moderator that 
needs to be considered when making mortality salient. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
General Discussion 
Humans have a need to feel they belong in and are part of a group (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1997). While there are many overlapping partial explanations for why people are 
motivated to join groups, there is no single comprehensive explanation. According to the 
self-esteem hypothesis (as outlined by Abrams & Hogg, 1988), the primary motivation 
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behind social identification is the desire for a positive social identity, which arises from 
an individual-level self-esteem need. However, uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2001, 
2005, 2007, 2012) argues that feelings of uncertainty, especially those related to the self, 
motivate people to identify with social groups that best reduce, control, or protect from 
feelings of uncertainty. Finally, TMT suggest that identifying with groups attenuates 
anxiety associated with thinking about death. Groups help people feel that their life has 
meaning, and this feeling of existential meaningfulness reduces anxiety associated with 
their fear of dying (Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002; Castano, 
2004; Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). The purpose of this dissertation was 
to unravel the relationship between mortality salience, self-related uncertainty, and self-
esteem on group identification and defense of the ingroup across three experiments. 
Experiment 1 provided a complete examination of the relationship between 
uncertainty and self-esteem on group identification and defense of the ingroup. The 
general hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, was that uncertainty would increase 
defense of the ingroup and that this relationship would be mediated by identification with 
the ingroup, regardless of self-esteem. Research by Hogg and Svensson (2012) first tested 
the relationship between self-esteem and uncertainty on identification; however, a 
limitation to that study was that there was no direct test of the causal relationship between 
self-esteem and uncertainty. Both self-esteem and uncertainty were manipulated, with 
defense of the ingroup as the dependent variable and identification with the ingroup as 
the mediator. Following predictions, results demonstrated that regardless of self-esteem 
participants identified more strongly with and defended the ingroup more when they were 
uncertain. As well, identification with the ingroup mediated the relationship between 
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uncertainty and defense of the ingroup. These results suggest that uncertainty plays a 
more important role in identification than self-esteem – bolstering the results of Hogg and 
Svensson (2012). Also, the inclusion of defense of the ingroup as a dependent measure 
provides a unique contribution to the UIT literature, as no study to date has explored the 
effects of uncertainty on defending one’s ingroup. When self-uncertainty is high not only 
will people seek out and identify with groups but they will also be more likely to defend 
their ingroup if it is criticized. Future research should continue exploring the affects of 
self-uncertainty on other non-identification related group behaviors, such as the 
willingness to tolerate ingroup dissenters.  
Experiment 2 provided a replication of the typical TMT study, that self-esteem 
would buffer against the effects of mortality salience on defense of the ingroup, with the 
additional test of the mediating effects of identification with the ingroup between 
mortality salience and defense of one’s group. Participants’ self-esteem and mortality 
salience were manipulated and the same dependent measures from experiment 1 were 
used in experiment 2. As predicted, and in accordance with previous research, mortality 
salience only increased identification with and defense of the ingroup when self-esteem 
was not enhanced – enhancing self-esteem attenuated the effects of mortality salience. 
Also following predictions, but unique to the literature, identification mediated the effects 
of the relationship between self-esteem and mortality salience on defense of the ingroup.  
Finally, Experiment 3 was a combination of Experiment 1 and 2, experimentally 
manipulating self-esteem, mortality salience, and self-uncertainty. The general 
hypothesis, from uncertainty-identity theory, was that uncertainty would moderate the 
relationship between mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of and identification 
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with the ingroup – such that we should only expect the typical TMT results 
(demonstrated in Experiment 2) under high but not low uncertainty.  In contrast, TMT 
would predict an interaction between mortality salience and self-esteem – all participants, 
irrespective of their self-uncertainty, would defend the ingroup more under neutral self-
esteem and mortality salience than under high self-esteem or when mortality is not made 
salient. Exactly as predicted, under high uncertainty the typical TMT results are 
demonstrated – mortality salience only increased identification with the ingroup and 
defense of the ingroup when self-esteem was not enhanced. As well, under high 
uncertainty, the interactive effects of mortality salience and self-esteem on defense of 
ingroup were mediated by identification. However, under low uncertainty, mortality 
salience did not increase identification or defense of the ingroup nor did self-esteem 
buffer against the effects of MS. These results support the uncertainty-identity theory 
analysis of the role of uncertainty in the TMT paradigm and suggest that uncertainty is 
the key underlying process that occurs when people think about their death, because, 
when uncertainty was low, thinking about one’s death had no impact on participants 
identification with or defense of America. 
Overall, focusing on the key prediction, the research reported in this dissertation 
provides reliable support across three experiments for uncertainty-identity theory’s 
analysis of the relationship between uncertainty and group identification – namely that it 
is uncertainty and not terror associated with mortality salience or self-esteem that 
produces group identification and thus ideological conviction and other group 
identification-related phenomena. Low self-esteem is an unsettling state that has been 
associated with a host of negative outcomes and self-protecting and enhancing 
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motivations (e.g., Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995), 
however, this research combined with Hogg and Svensson (2012) suggest that motivation 
to identify with a group is not one of them. As well, dying is a fearful, so there is little 
doubt that there may be terror associated with thinking about one’s own death and that 
this powerful emotion will cause certain effects. However, group identification and 
ideological conviction may not be “caused” by terror, but rather by self-uncertainty 
associated with thoughts about the afterlife. Especially when we combine these results 
with Hohman and Hogg (2011) and the work by Van den Bos (2009), and McGregor 
(2006). 
One immediate direction for future studies on uncertainty-identity theory and 
TMT would be to empirically show, as predicted by uncertainty-identity theory, that 
uncertainty is a stronger determinant of people’s desire to identify with highly entitative 
groups, and develop intolerant attitudes towards both ingroup and outgroup dissenters. As 
well, because the focus of TMT is death, future research should explore the relationship 
between mortality salience and uncertainty in a religious context to determine if these 
results are replicated using religious groups (cf. Hogg, Adelman & Blagg, 2010). Another 
interesting program of research would be to conceptualize and empirically demonstrate 
conditions that incline mortality salience to generate existential terror or incline it to 
generate uncertainty.  
Beyond TMT and the self-esteem hypothesis, there are other theories that predict 
motivators for identification (e.g., optimal distinctiveness, Brewer, 1991; sociometer 
model, Leary et al., 1995) – future research is necessary to determine the relationship 
between these constructs and uncertainty on group identification. Finally, as of yet, few if 
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no meta-analyses have been conducted to compile all of the research on the various 
motivators for group identification. A well-designed and thorough meta-analysis would 
provide a more complete picture of the various motivators’ absolute impact on group 
identification and uncover moderators for when and how each motivator will be more 
likely to stimulate people to identify with a group and defend their ideological conviction.  
What we have learned from this dissertation is that uncertainty plays a key role in 
motivating people to identify with groups and may very well be the most important 
motivator of group identification. While self-esteem may be enhanced from identifying 
with a group, these results demonstrated that self-esteem does not invoke group 
identification motivation. As well, thinking about one’s own death may lead one to 
identify more strongly with one’s cultural institutions, but it is uncertainty, not terror 
associated with death that strengthens identification and ideological defense – a finding 
that is consistent with uncertainty-identity theory. 
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Appendix A: Personality Test 
You have a great need for other people to like and admire you. 
 
  True   False 
 
You have a tendency to be critical of yourself.  
 
  True   False 
 
You have a great deal of unused capacity, which you have not turned to your advantage. 
 
  True   False 
 
While you have some personality weaknesses, you are generally able to compensate for 
them. 
 
  True   False 
 
Your sexual adjustment has presented problems for you. 
 
  True   False 
 
Disciplined and self-controlled outside, you tend to be worrisome and insecure inside. 
 
  True   False 
 
At times you have serious doubts as to whether you have made the right decision or done 
the right thing. 
 
  True   False 
 
You prefer a certain amount of change and variety and become dissatisfied when 
hemmed in by restrictions and limitations. 
 
  True   False 
 
 
You pride yourself as an independent thinker and do not accept others' statements without 
satisfactory proof. 
 
  True   False 
 
You have found it unwise to be too frank in revealing yourself to others. 
 
  True   False 
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At times you are extroverted, affable, and sociable, while at other times you are 
introverted, wary, reserved. 
 
  True   False 
 
Some of your aspirations tend to be pretty unrealistic. 
 
  True   False 
 
Security is one of your major goals in life. 
 
  True   False 
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Appendix B: Personality Assessment 
Psychological Assessment Report 
Confidential 
 
Based on the answers you provided for the personality test the following assessment has 
been put together. 
 
ELEVATED SELF-ESTEEM CONDITION 
 
While you may feel that you have some personality weaknesses your personality is 
fundamentally strong. Most of your aspirations tend to be pretty realistic. 
 
NEUTRAL SELF-ESTEEM CONDITION 
 
While you have some personality weaknesses, you are generally able to compensate for 
them. However, some of your aspirations may be a bit unrealistic. 
 
Please Answer the following two questions about your personality assessment. 
 
 
Please indicate how effective the personality test is in revealing your personality. 
 
Poor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9      Perfect 
 
Please indicate the degree to which the personality description reveals basic 
characteristics of your personality. 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9      completely 
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Appendix C: PANAS 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate the extent to which you feel this way right now, that is, at this present moment. 
Use the following scale to record your answers. 
            
         1     2          3          4   5  
Very Slightly  a little  moderately quite a bit      extremely                         
Or not at all 
_______Interested  _______Irritable 
_______Distressed  _______Alert 
_______Excited  _______Ashamed 
_______Upset  _______Inspired 
_______Strong  _______Nervous 
_______Guilty  _______Determined 
_______Scared  _______Attentive 
_______Hostile  _______Jittery 
_______Enthusiastic _______Active 
_______Proud  _______Afraid 
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Appendix D: Essay Stimuli 
 
Second Study. 
The second part of this study is concerned with foreigners’ views of the US 
and Americans reactions to these views. We have collected several essays 
written by foreigners about America, we have selected two essays for you to 
read and evaluate.  
Please read each essay carefully and answer the questions that follow. 
Essay 1 (Pro-America Essay). 
The first thing that hit me when I came to this country was the incredible freedom people 
had.  Freedom to go to school, freedom to work in any job you want.  In this country 
people can go to school and train for the job they want.  Here anyone who works hard can 
make own their success.  In my country most people live in poverty with no chance of 
escape.  In this country people have more opportunity for success than in any other and 
success does not depend on the group belong to.  While there are problems in any 
country, America truly a great nation and I don’t regret my decision to come here at all.  
 
How much do you like this person? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
How intelligent did you think this person was? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
How much did you agree with this person’s opinion of America? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion of America is? 
 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
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Essay 2 (Anti-America Essay). 
When I first came to this country I believed it was the “land of opportunity” but I soon 
realized this was only true for the rich.  The system here is set up for rich against the 
poor.  All people care about here is money and trying to have more than other people.  
This no sympathy for people.  Its all one group putting down others and nobody cares 
about the foreigners.  Americans are spoiled and lazy and want everything handed to 
them.  America is a cold country that is insensitive to needs and problems of foreigners.  
It thinks it’s a great country but its not. If America does not change how they threat the 
rest of the world there will be more terrorist attacks on their soil.  
 
How much do you like this person? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
How intelligent did you think this person was? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
How knowledgeable did you think this person was? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
How much did you agree with this person’s opinion of America? 
 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion of America is? 
 
 Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Totally 
 
 
 
